Optimal Queue Design
Abstract
This talk focuses on the optimal design of a queueing system where the designer selects entry and exit rules, service priority, and information provision. The objective is to ensure that agents have incentives to join and stay in the queue while also considering safety concerns. The speaker discusses different queueing disciplines and their impact on agents' beliefs and incentives. The talk highlights the role of first-come-first-served (FCFS) rule in regulating agents' dynamic incentives and provides insights into the design of optimal queueing systems.
Bio
Yeon-Koo Che is the Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory at Columbia University. His research contributions include mechanism and auction design, matching theory, and the study of fairness and efficiency in resource allocation. He is a Fellow of Econometric Society and has received several awards for his work, including the INFORMS Optimization Society Young Researchers Prize.
